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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal arises from a suit on five accidental death 
benefit (ADB) policies (with the five defendant insurance 
companies), each of which provides benefits for a death 
that is accidental and independent of all other causes. The 
plaintiff, Josephine Murray, is the widow of Arthur Murray 
who, having been admitted to a hospital for treatment of a 
serious ailment, died after his condition worsened following 
an accidental fall which resulted in a fractured hip. A jury 
found that Mr. Murray's death was within the scope and 
conditions of the policies, and returned a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff. The district court, however, determined that, 
because Mr. Murray suffered from a number of diseases 
and medical conditions prior to the accident, his death was 
not independent of all other causes, and entered judgment 
as a matter of law in favor of the defendants. 
 
At bottom, this appeal forces us to decide whether, under 
New Jersey law, a jury could reasonably find that Mr. 
Murray's death was accidental and independent of all other 
causes. Unfortunately, New Jersey law is opaque on what is 
the critical question here: whether a plaintiff can prevail if 
she can prove (1) that the insured's pre-existing condition 
or disease, though active and symptomatic, was under 
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medical control, and that the insured was expected to live 
a productive life for the foreseeable future (measured in 
terms of years); and (2) that the accident was the direct, 
efficient, and predominant cause of his death. Lacking a 
procedure that would enable us to certify this question to 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, we are forced to predict 
how that court would decide the issue. We predict that the 
court would answer in the affirmative, and hence we 
conclude that the district court incorrectly interpreted New 
Jersey law. Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain 
a verdict under New Jersey law as we interpret it, the order 
of the district court rendering judgment as a matter of law 
in favor of the defendants must be vacated. Although the 
district court's charge to the jury was erroneous under the 
law as we now predict it, the findings necessarily implied by 
the jury's verdict under the incorrect instructions make 
clear that the jury would have reached the same conclusion 
under correct instructions, and thus we direct the district 
court to reinstate the original verdict in plaintiff 's favor. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
On February 18, 1992, Mr. Murray, age 71, was admitted 
to the hospital due to swelling and pain in his foot. While 
hospitalized, he developed gangrene, and on March 2 his 
foot was amputated. For several weeks following the 
surgery, his temperature was high and he remained 
hospitalized. This fever broke on April 6, and he was 
scheduled to be discharged on April 11. On April 10, 
however, his temperature began to rise again, and when it 
continued to rise on the morning of April 11, the discharge 
plans were canceled. At approximately 11:45 p.m. on the 
evening of the 11th, Mr. Murray fell while walking from the 
bathroom to his hospital bed, resulting in a fractured hip. 
 
Mr. Murray's temperature continued to rise on April 12 
and he became gravely ill. Although he was a "high risk" for 
surgery due to pre-existing diabetic, heart, and liver 
conditions (described infra), Mr. Murray's attending 
physician determined that he "[would] be totally 
incapacitated and probably [would] not heal without 
surgical intervention" on the broken hip. Mr. Murray's 
condition apparently stabilized over the subsequent week, 
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and the hip surgery was performed on April 22. Following 
that surgery, his condition steadily worsened. He suffered 
acute respiratory distress, progressive sepsis, acute renal 
failure, and a cardiac arrest. In addition, he also 
experienced a left pleural effusion. This condition was 
caused primarily by heart failure and low protein, and only 
appeared after the hip fracture. Finally, Mr. Murray 
required an emergency hemodialysis because of 
hyperkalemia. He died on May 10, 1992. The death 
certificate listed the causes of death as renal failure, sepsis, 
and renal transplant. 
 
A. Mr. Murray's Prior Medical Condition 
 
Prior to his fall, Mr. Murray had been diagnosed with a 
significant number of medical problems; those from which 
he suffered at the time of his death are catalogued in the 
margin.1 He had coronary artery disease, a condition 
relatively common among older Americans, and suffered 
intermittently from atrial fibrillation. While Mr. Murray's 
heart was not fibrillating at the time he came into the 
hospital, he subsequently developed partial atrial 
fibrillation after the accident. He also had hypertension, 
which was elevated on the morning of April 11, prior to the 
accident. Still, Dr. Scotti, plaintiff 's expert, opined that 
there was no reason to believe that Mr. Murray was in any 
imminent danger of an acute heart attack. Moreover, the 
infarctions noted on his discharge summary, see n.1, 
supra, occurred after the accident, and, according to 
evidence adduced at trial, were caused by the fall. 
 
In addition, Mr. Murray suffered from renal disease, 
which had necessitated two earlier kidney transplants (the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The discharge summary prepared by the hospital after Mr. Murray's 
death lists fifteen conditions under the heading "Final Diagnoses." That 
list includes: uremia; cellulitis of the left foot with gangrene; 
intertrochanteric and subtrochanteric fracture, right hip; peripheral 
vascular disease, severe; diabetes mellitus; end-stage renal disease, 
secondary to autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease; status post 
kidney transplant; acute renal failure, secondary to sepsis; 
atherosclerotic heart disease; fever of undetermined origin; left pleural 
effusion; hepatocellular necrosis, idiopathic; fat emboli syndrome; 
pneumonia; acute, non-Q wave myocardial infarction. 
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first in the 1970s and the second in the 1980s) and 
required continuous medication to suppress his immune 
system and to prevent his body from rejecting the 
transplanted organ. As a result, he had "some immune 
deficiency." Dr. Scotti testified, however, that Mr. Murray's 
kidney function was "fine" prior to the accident, and that he 
did not appear to be in any danger of imminent kidney 
failure at that time. 
 
Sometime after his second kidney transplant, Mr. Murray 
developed Diabetes Mellitus. According to Dr. Nasberg, an 
endocrinologist, this condition was also under control prior 
to the accident. Additionally, he suffered from peripheral 
vascular disease (i.e. the obstruction or narrowing of the 
blood vessels to the legs and feet), which led to the trans- 
metatarsal amputation of his foot. Dr. Scotti nonetheless 
testified that "there was no evidence that his foot was a 
problem" after the amputation. Although Mr. Murray still 
suffered from peripheral vascular disease after the 
amputation -- which could have lead to complications if he 
was to suffer another similar injury -- he did not have any 
active gangrene or any specific symptoms prior to his fall. 
 
As noted supra, Mr. Murray also suffered from a fever of 
unknown origin while in the hospital for treatment of his 
foot. Although the defendant offered testimony at trial that 
this fever was indicative of pneumonia, and that it was that 
pneumonia that lead to Mr. Murray's death, Dr. Scotti 
testified to the contrary. In his opinion, Mr. Murray's clear 
chest and lack of cough prior to the accident would make 
the possibility of pneumonia highly unlikely. Furthermore, 
he had suffered from hepatitis for the fifteen-year period 
prior to 1992, and Dr. Scotti hypothesized that the most 
likely cause of the pre-accident fever was chronic active 
liver disease. 
 
B. Dr. Scotti's Theory 
 
It was not disputed by Dr. Scotti at trial that had Mr. 
Murray been a perfectly healthy seventy-one year old man 
at the time of the accident, he would probably not have 
died as a result thereof. Yet, it was Dr. Scotti's testimony 
that the accident caused Mr. Murray's death. In sum, Dr. 
Scotti opined that the hip fracture triggered a"cascade of 
 
                                6 
  
events" that directly lead to Mr. Murray's death-- and that 
had it not been for the fracture, Mr. Murray would not have 
died on April 11. 
 
Briefly put, the "cascade" theory works as follows. 
According to Dr. Scotti, all of Mr. Murray's pre-existing 
conditions (heart problems, kidney disease, etc.) were under 
control at the time he went into the hospital for treatment 
of his foot. The fall and subsequent hip fracture either 
aggravated the pre-existing conditions out of their 
controlled state, or caused new conditions (such as the 
Non-Q-wave infarction) to arise, which ultimately lead to 
death. For example, Dr. Scotti testified that the Fat Emboli 
Syndrome noted on Mr. Murray's discharge summary was 
specifically caused by the fractured hip.2 It was this 
condition which most likely caused his temperature to rise 
significantly after the accident. Moreover, it was Dr. Scotti's 
opinion that the fall ultimately spurred on Mr. Murray's 
liver disease (i.e. hepatitis B). 
 
As for Mr. Murray's renal failure, it too appears that the 
jury could have reasonably inferred from the testimony that 
this problem also was triggered by the accident. Dr. Scotti 
testified that "the end stage renal failure was certainly a 
result of the cascade effect" caused by the fall. Indeed, Dr. 
Genovese-Stone, defendants' expert at trial, conceded that 
Mr. Murray was not in kidney failure the day before he fell, 
that there was nothing in the medical records to indicate 
that his kidney was about to fail, and that, with his 
medication, Mr. Murray's kidney condition was under 
control prior to the fall. 
 
C. Mr. Murray's Insurance and the Litigation Thereon 
 
At the time of Mr. Murray's death, he owned accidental 
death benefit policies worth various amounts from the five 
defendant insurance companies.3 Plaintiff Josephine 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Dr. Scotti described Fat Emboli Syndrome as a condition in which the 
fatty materials from the patient's bone marrow escape into the 
bloodstream. These materials can then form small clots in the patient's 
lung and block the lung vessels. App. at 72A. 
 
3. Those policies (and their values) are the following: United of Omaha 
Life Insurance Company ($3,995.00); Mutual of Omaha Insurance 
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Murray was the named beneficiary under each of these 
policies, and after Mr. Murray died, she filed claims for 
benefits pursuant to them. Each of the insurance 
companies independently reviewed Mrs. Murray's claim, 
determined that Mr. Murray's death was not accidental, 
and refused to pay benefits. 
 
On May 10, 1994, Mrs. Murray filed a complaint in 
Superior Court, Monmouth County, New Jersey, against the 
insurance companies, who removed the case to the District 
Court for the District of New Jersey. On September 13, 
1996, a jury returned a verdict in Mrs. Murray's favor. After 
the jury was excused, the district court granted the 
insurance companies' renewed motion for judgment as a 
matter of law, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 
Mrs. Murray appeals.4 The insurance companies cross- 
appeal, contending that the district court erred in charging 
the jury. 
 
II. The District Court's Opinion 
 
The parties have stipulated that Mrs. Murray is entitled 
to recover benefits under the present ADB policies only if 
her husband's death "was the result of bodily injury directly 
from an accident and independent of all other causes." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Company ($80,200.00); American Home Assurance Company 
($25,000.00); Hartford Life Insurance Company ($75,000.00); John 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company ($26,250.00). Mr. Murray also 
owned accidental death policies from Legionnaire Insurance Trust 
Program and the Insurance Company of North America. Although these 
latter two companies were named in the complaint, they settled with 
Mrs. Murray and are not parties to this appeal. 
 
4. Removal of this action from state court to the district court was 
appropriate under 28 U.S.C. S 1441(a), as the district court had original 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1332. We have jurisdiction over this 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review is plenary, and we will 
sustain the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law if 
"there 
is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury" to 
return 
a verdict in favor of Mrs. Murray. Rhone Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals 
Inc. v. Newman Glass Works, 112 F.3d 695, 696 (3d Cir. 1997). The 
evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. See Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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They also agree that this language must be interpreted 
according to the law of New Jersey. Sitting in diversity, we 
must predict how the highest court of New Jersey would 
rule. See Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 378 
(3d Cir. 1990). We begin by reviewing the district court's 
interpretation and application of New Jersey's law in this 
matter. 
 
In its opinion granting judgment as a matter of law to the 
defendants, the district court read New Jersey law to 
require a case by case evaluation which takes into account 
both the mechanism by which death occurs and the 
"nature and severity of the underlying conditions or 
diseases." (See Amended Transcript of Trial, Sept. 13, 1996 
at 12-13 [hereinafter "Transcript"].) The "telling rule" derived 
from the New Jersey cases, according to the district court, 
is that: 
 
       where the medical proofs establish affirmatively that 
       the active disease, with which the insured was afflicted 
       and for which he was being treated, not only was 
       competent to contribute to his death, but in the 
       opinion of his own physician, did in fact operate in 
       conjunction with an accidental injury to produce the 
       demise, the Court has no alternative but to take the 
       case from the jury. 
 
From this, the district court found New Jersey to prescribe 
a two-pronged test. First, in order to recover, the insured 
must show that his pre-existing conditions were "inactive 
and under control, and were not sufficient to cause death." 
In the district court's view, if any pre-existing condition was 
"active, known, symptomatic, or progressive, and of such a 
nature and severity in and of itself so as to be capable of 
contributing to death," this first element would not be met. 
Second, the district court held that the insured must show 
that the accidental injury was the "direct, efficient and 
predominant cause of death, in that it set in progress the 
chain of events leading directly to death by exciting or 
triggering the pre-existing conditions into activity, and 
thereby hastened death so as to cause it to occur at an 
earlier period than it would have occurred but for the 
accident." 
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The district court then reviewed the evidence. Most 
notably, the district court referenced Dr. Scotti's testimony 
that all of Mr. Murray's conditions were controlled at the 
time of the fall; that these conditions were not likely to 
cause death at the time death occurred; and that, in Dr. 
Scotti's opinion, the fall was the proximate cause of Mr. 
Murray's decline, which led to his death. Indeed, according 
to Dr. Scotti, Mr. Murray would have lived for several more 
years but for the accident.5 Based on these facts, the 
district court concluded that judgment as a matter of law 
was not warranted on prong two of the New Jersey test (i.e. 
causation). 
 
Nonetheless, the district court found that Dr. Scotti's 
testimony did not provide sufficient evidentiary support for 
plaintiff to meet her burden on the first prong of the test. 
This was because several of the diseases and conditions 
from which Mr. Murray was suffering, including 
arteriosclerotic heart disease, peripheral vascular disease, 
diabetes, hepatitis B, and renal failure, were "active" and 
because they, singularly or in combination, together with 
the accidental injury, in some manner were contributing 
causes of Mr. Murray's death. Moreover, the district court 
relied upon Dr. Scotti's testimony that if Mr. Murray had 
been a "perfectly healthy 71 year old," then it was much 
less likely that he would have died from the hip fracture, 
that his death was made "much more likely" by his 
combination of existing medical problems at the time of the 
accident, and that in Dr. Scotti's opinion there was "no way 
that the fall was the sole cause of death." While Dr. Scotti 
testified that all of Mr. Murray's pre-existing conditions 
were under control at the time of the accident, the district 
court found that 
 
       the particulars, the specifics of Dr. Scotti's testimony 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. For example, Dr. Scotti testified that 
 
       "...about five percent of people with hepatitis will go on to have 
       chronic active liver disease but they will live for years and 
years. He 
       was not in hepatic failure and was not -- did not have cirrhosis, 
so 
       that again before the fracture, his liver disease did not pose an 
       immediate threat of death or death within a year or two or three or 
       four." 
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       make it clear that he acknowledged that several of Mr. 
       Murray's conditions were, in fact, not under control at 
       the time of the accident, and that these conditions 
       were among the conditions which contributed to his 
       ultimate demise. 
 
On this basis, the court found for defendants. 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has never addressed the 
ultimate question before us, and there are conflicting 
strains in New Jersey law. Nonetheless, we predict that 
under these circumstances, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court's approach to resolving this dispute would differ from 
the approach utilized by the district court. 
 
III. The New Jersey Jurisprudence on the Interpretation 
       of Accidental Death Benefit Clauses 
 
The question before us is whether the district court 
correctly predicted how the New Jersey Supreme Court 
would rule on the present facts. The district court deduced 
its two-pronged test from three cases dealing with the 
construction of ADB clauses in New Jersey: Runyon v. 
Commonwealth Casualty Co., 160 A. 402 (N.J. 1932) 
("Runyon II"); Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 
A.2d 22 (N.J. 1961); and Tomaiuoli v. United States Fidelity 
and Guaranty Co., 182 A.2d 582 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1962). We will look to these cases and others to determine 
how the New Jersey courts have treated the construction of 
ADB limited coverage clauses in the past. Since, as we 
discuss infra, the holdings of these cases are largely 
dependent upon their particular facts, we will also make 
reference to modern intrajurisdictional trends and scholarly 
opinions on how these clauses should be construed. 
 
A. The Strict Construction Model -- Runyon I & II 
 
The first major New Jersey opinions treating issues 
similar to those before us were the related cases of Runyon 
v. Monarch Accident Ins. Co., 158 A. 530 (N.J. 1932) 
("Runyon I") and Runyon II, supra. Both cases dealt with the 
same accident, in which the insured slipped on an icy 
pavement, broke his hip, and died about five weeks later. 
The evidence showed that the insured had suffered for 
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eleven years prior to the accident from a condition then 
known as "paralysis agitans" (known more commonly now 
as Parkinson's Disease), and the death certificate listed the 
cause of death as "fractured left hip from slipping on ice; 
contributory paralysis agitans (secondary) duration 11 
years." Runyon I, 158 A. at 532. The insured's physician 
testified at trial that his use of the word "contributory" 
meant that if the insured had been in normal health, he 
would have "stood a much better chance" to recover from 
the shock of the hip fracture. See id. 
 
The ADB policy in Runyon I provided that the defendant 
was liable only if death resulted "exclusively from bodily 
injuries caused solely by external, violent and accidental 
means." Id. at 531. The court held that"under such a 
policy, if the insured, at the time of the accidental injury, 
was also suffering from a disease, and the disease 
aggravated the effects of the accident, and actively 
contributed to the death occasioned thereby, there can be 
no recovery upon the policy." Id. On this basis, the court 
upheld the verdict for the defendant. 
 
Runyon II involved the same facts, though construed 
under a different insurance policy. The relevant policy 
language in that case provided for benefits so long as death 
or bodily injury was caused: 
 
       directly and independently of all other causes by 
       external, violent, and accidental means, which bodily 
       injuries, or their effects, shall not be caused wholly or 
       in part, directly or indirectly, by any bodily or mental 
       disease, defect or infirmity. 
 
Runyon II, 160 A. at 403. The trial court denied the 
defendant's motion for a nonsuit, and the jury returned a 
verdict for the plaintiff. The New Jersey high court reversed.6 
Since it was uncontroverted that the insured's pre-existing 
condition had, to some extent, caused the death of the 
insured, the court held that the case fell squarely within 
the exempting condition of the policy -- i.e. that the death 
was not caused directly and independently of all causes 
other than the accident. See id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The court was then known as the Court of Errors and Appeals. 
 
                                12 
  
B. The Modern Model -- Mahon and Kievit 
 
About thirty years after Runyon II, the New Jersey 
Superior Court Appellate Division broke from Runyon's 
apparently strict dictates in Mahon v. American Casualty 
Co. of Reading, 167 A.2d 191 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1961). The facts of Mahon can be simply stated. The 
deceased, a nine year old boy who appeared to be in good 
health, was playing in his schoolyard during recess when 
he accidentally bumped his head against the head of a 
schoolmate. Soon thereafter, the boy developed symptoms 
prompting a medical examination. That examination and 
subsequent diagnostic operations revealed that the boy had 
a condition known as the Arnold-Chiari malformation. 
According to expert testimony at trial, the malformation 
was caused by a tumor deep within the boy's brain; while 
the tumor and the malformation existed prior to the head 
injury, they were in a "quiescent" state and it took the 
trauma of the head injury to cause the boy's acute 
symptoms. See id. at 194-95. Moreover, the expert testified 
that but for the tumor, the acute symptoms would not have 
occurred; yet, but for the head trauma, the tumor would 
not have caused the malformation to become acute"for a 
further interval of time." See id. at 195. 
 
The court recognized that cases like Runyon II reflected a 
"pronounced tendency" in the law "to hold for the insurer 
as a matter of law, if there is uncontroverted evidence of 
causal contribution by disease or abnormality to the loss." 
Id. at 198. At the same time, the court noted a "not 
inconsiderable number of decisions" which held that such 
evidence could still support a verdict for the insured if the 
jury was to find that the accident operated as the proximate 
or predominant cause of the loss. See id. The court also 
distinguished between two types of limitation clauses found 
in ADB policies. The first (found in Mahon and in the 
stipulation here), known as a "limited coverage clause," is 
typically of the form: "loss resulting directly and 
independently of all other causes from injury caused by 
accident." Id. at 196. The second (found in Runyon II) is 
known as an "exclusionary clause," and is of the form: 
"which bodily injuries, or their effects, shall not be caused 
wholly or in part, directly or indirectly, by any bodily or 
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mental disease, defect, or infirmity." Id. Examining cases 
from several jurisdictions, the court concluded that the 
exclusionary clause constitutes a significantly more 
restrictive contract than the limited coverage clause. See id. 
at 199. 
 
In light of these considerations, Mahon held that the 
"mere conjunction of disease or abnormality and accident, 
each `but for' causes of the resulting disability, and neither 
alone efficient to produce it" does not necessarily bar 
recovery as a matter of law in a limited coverage case. See 
id. at 200. The court opined: 
 
       In what seems to us a preponderance of American 
       jurisdictions, the test is whether the accidental injury 
       as contrasted with the contributing disease or bodily 
       condition, is the proximate cause of the disability or 
       loss. . . . Pervading such cases is the philosophy that 
       if the accident is a more substantial contributing cause 
       of the resultant disability or death than the disease, 
       the latter merely being a condition thereof, recovery is 
       allowed. 
 
Id. at 201. The court held that this result was not 
foreclosed by Runyon I. Although Runyon I mentioned a 
"general rule" that recovery should be barred if a pre- 
existing disease aggravated the accident and "actively 
contributed" to the death occasioned by the accident, 
Mahon's review of the case law suggested that Runyon I's 
statement could not reflect the "general rule" unless "active 
contribution" was understood to mean "predominant 
cause." Mahon, 167 A.2d at 205. The court also 
distinguished Runyon II on the basis that the policy in that 
case involved an exclusionary clause, whereas the policy in 
Mahon only involved a limited coverage clause. We do not 
rely on this distinction, however, because, as we note 
below, the modern trend (at least in New Jersey) is to treat 
both clauses the same. See infra at n. 7. 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court evinced an intent to 
follow the modern liberal trend outlined in Mahon in Kievit 
v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22 (N.J. 1961), the 
court's most recent treatment of the issue at hand. The 
insured in Kievit was a forty-seven year old carpenter, who 
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appeared to be in perfectly good health, without any 
diagnosed diseases or conditions, and with no symptoms. 
The accident occurred when the insured was struck over 
the left eye by a two-by-four, after which he developed 
"tremors" and became totally disabled. Kievit, 170 A.2d at 
24. Testimony at trial indicated that the insured actually 
had (although asymptomatic) Parkinson's Disease prior to 
the accident, which the accident had aggravated. See id. at 
25. 
 
The trial court entered judgment for the defendant 
insurance company and the Supreme Court reversed. This 
case, the court held, was distinguishable from both Runyon 
opinions. In those cases: 
 
       a patent, active disease was found to have contributed 
       with the accident to the resulting death of the insured. 
       We are here concerned with a latent, inactive condition 
       or disease which was not accompanied by any 
       symptoms and which was precipitated or activated by 
       the accident into a resulting disability. 
 
Id. at 27. Although the policy held by the insured in Kievit 
contained an exclusionary clause, the court did notfind 
that Mahon was distinguishable on this basis.7 Rather, the 
Kievit court held that the key was the reasonable 
expectations of the insured. See id. at 30 ("[T]he court's goal 
in construing an accident insurance policy is to effectuate 
the reasonable expectations of the average member of the 
public who buys it."). 
 
In what we consider the most critical passage of the 
opinion, the court held: 
 
       When the Company issued its accident policy to Mr. 
       Kievit it knew that, although he was then about 48 and 
       in good health, he could and presumably would keep 
       the policy in force until he was 65 and that in the 
       course of time he would undoubtedly be subjected to 
       bodily conditions and diseases incident to the aging 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. "In the instant matter we attach little significance to the presence of 
the exclusionary clause in view of the primary provision limiting coverage 
to loss from accidental bodily injuries, directly and independently of all 
other causes." Kievit, 170 A.2d at 30. 
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       process. If the terms of the policy were read literally, 
       the policy would be of little value to him since disability 
       or death resulting from accidental injury would in all 
       probability be in some sense contributed to by the 
       infirmities of age. . . . Such literal reading was never 
       contemplated and it may fairly and justly be concluded 
       that it also was never contemplated that indemnity 
       would be unavailable where a condition or disease 
       which was wholly dormant was activated and became 
       disabling as the result of an accidental injury. 
 
Id. at 30 (emphasis added). The court then further clarified 
its position by quoting the following passage from United 
States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Hood, 87 So. 115, 120 
(Miss. Sup. Ct. 1921): 
 
       It is not sufficient to defeat the policy that the accident 
       may have made some latent disease active, which 
       disease contributed in some degree to the death. If the 
       disease was active and of such character and virulence 
       as to endanger life apart from the accident, but might 
       not have done so had the accident not happened, then 
       that may be said to be a proximate contributing cause. 
 
Kievit, 170 A.2d at 30. Based on this rationale, the court 
held that the accident was the proximate cause of the 
insured's disability, and that his pre-existing disease, 
"activated by the accident into an incapacitating condition," 
was not a disqualifying contributing cause. Id. at 31. 
 
Thus, Kievit and Mahon can be read most plausibly to 
hold that the construction of limited coverage clauses in 
ADB policies depends upon some form of proximate 
causation analysis in order to fairly represent the 
reasonable expectations of the insured. At the very least, if 
the pre-existing condition is found to have been"active" (as 
opposed to the "latent" condition at issue in Kievit), these 
cases would appear to require a factual determination 
whether the condition was "of such character and virulence 
as to endanger life apart from the accident" in some 
relevant medical sense, or whether the accident precipitated 
the condition into a resulting disability. See Kievit, 170 
A.2d at 27, 30. 
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This approach suggests what scholars have deemed the 
modern tendency of courts dealing with limited coverage 
clauses like these: 
 
       It has thus been the tendency to hold that where the 
       disease was not a direct, proximate, or concurring 
       cause of the loss recovery would be allowed, regardless 
       of the existence of such condition. . . . Other courts 
       have taken a still broader view, consistent with that 
       which the authors urge herein as being the better 
       approach, that recovery may still be had where the 
       diseased condition appeared actually to contribute to 
       cause the death, where the accident was the prime or 
       moving cause. This has come to be the more modern 
       rule, irrespective of the stringencies of policy language, 
       where injury is a proximate cause of death or 
       disability, even though the result for which claim is 
       made would, perhaps, not have occurred except for the 
       preexisting condition. 
 
John Alan Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice S 393 at 81, 85-90 (1981); see also Robert E. 
Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law S 5.4(b)(2) at 502 
(1988) (stating that in ADB cases, "courts tend to interpret 
the coverage provisions and limitations so as to favor the 
interests of the beneficiaries when the evidence indicates 
the death or injury was essentially fortuitous."). For the 
reasons discussed infra, we believe that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would follow this modern approach in the 
present case. 
 
C. The Appellate Division Returns to Runyon-- Tomaiuoli 
 
Shortly after Kievit was handed down, the Appellate 
Division revisited the Runyon approach in Tomaiuoli v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 182 A.2d 582 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962). In that case, the insured, a 
seventy-two year old man who had a history of 
arteriosclerotic heart disease and diabetes, was involved in 
a minor traffic accident, from which he suffered no bodily 
injuries. Shortly thereafter, while still at the accident scene, 
the insured collapsed on the sidewalk from a heart attack, 
and died before an ambulance could arrive. The plaintiff, 
relying upon expert medical testimony, claimed that the car 
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accident led to a "chain of events" that caused the insured's 
death. See id. at 586. The court ultimately found that the 
accident was "the precipitating cause of exciting the 
decedent to a degree greater than he was able to withstand 
physically by reason of the underlying systemic maladies 
with which he was afflicted, with the consequence that he 
collapsed." Id. at 587. The insurance policy, as in Runyon 
II, provided for the payment of benefits for accidental 
injuries resulting in death only if the loss resulted "directly 
and independently of all other causes." Tomaiuoli, 182 A.2d 
at 588. 
 
The appellate division found this case to be factually and 
legally indistinguishable from Runyon II, and affirmed the 
trial court's judgment notwithstanding a verdict in favor of 
the defendant. The court found that in both cases: 
 
       the insured persons were, and had been, suffering from 
       active diseases, progressive in nature, capable of 
       producing fatality, and presenting symptoms which 
       brought home to the victims and their respective 
       doctors knowledge of their existence. Moreover, in both 
       cases the treating physicians confessed inability to 
       separate the effects of the bodily injury from the effects 
       of the pre-existing active disease, and felt obliged to 
       conclude that the total of such effects in combination 
       produced the death. 
 
182 A.2d at 588. In this light, the court held that: 
 
       Where, as here, his medical proofs establish 
       affirmatively that the active disease with which he was 
       afflicted, and for which he was being treated, not only 
       was competent to contribute to his death, but in the 
       opinion of his own physician, did in fact operate in 
       conjunction with an accidental injury to produce his 
       demise, the court has no alternative but to take the 
       case from the jury. 
 
Id. at 590. 
 
Thus, in the view of the Tomaiuoli court, Runyon I and 
Runyon II do not permit recovery when the pre-existing 
condition is an "[a]ctive, patent progressive disease which 
in its very nature is competent to contribute to death." Id. 
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While the court recognized that Kievit and Mahon "stand 
strongly for liberality of construction," it found that those 
cases only compelled a departure from the Runyon 
approach when the pre-existing condition was "[l]atent or 
[d]ormant, [a] symptom-free condition, possibly aggravated 
or exacerbated by bodily injury." Id. 
 
D. Application to the Present Case 
 
Not surprisingly, defendants contend that our disposition 
of this case should be controlled by Runyon II and 
Tomaiuoli. They submit that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
would follow Tomaiuoli's reading of the Runyon cases, 
Kievit, and Mahon and hold that, if a known and active pre- 
existing condition, capable in itself of producing fatality, 
actively contributes to the insured's death, recovery under 
the applicable ADB policies would not be permitted. 
Accordingly, they would have us affirm the district court's 
determination that the fact finder must determine as a 
threshold matter whether the pre-existing disease falls into 
one of two categories: either the disease is (1) an active, 
patent, progressive disease that by its very nature is 
competent to contribute to death; or it is (2) latent or 
dormant and symptom free. Under this test, if the condition 
falls within category (1), there can be no liability. According 
to the defendants, the facts of the present case, unlike 
Kievit, could not fall within category (2). To the contrary, 
they contend that this case is factually indistinguishable 
from Runyon II and Tomaiuoli, placing it squarely within 
category (1). 
 
Although Tomaiuoli clearly suggests that we should 
construe Runyon broadly and find no recovery any time the 
pre-existing condition is active and symptomatic, see 182 
A.2d at 588-89, we predict that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court would reject this view in light of Kievit's emphasis on 
the reasonable expectations of the insureds. Tomaiuoli, to 
be sure, recognizes the reasonable expectations doctrine, 
and the "liberality of construction" for which Kievit and 
Mahon stand. See Tomaiuoli, 182 A.2d at 590. We believe, 
however, that Tomaiuoli unduly limits the reach of both of 
these principles. Accordingly, we predict that the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, if faced with the present facts, 
would not adopt Tomaiuoli. See generally Nationwide 
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Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Pipher, ___ F.3d ___, 1998 WL 
113933 (3d Cir. 1998) (predicting that Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would not extend holding of its earlier 
decision as suggested by intervening decisions of other 
courts). 
 
We observe first that Kievit clearly rejected the 
proposition that there can be no liability if any known pre 
existing condition at all contributed to the insured's death. 
If that was the case, then an insured could only recover if 
he or she was in perfect health at the time of the accident. 
As another court, interpreting Kievit and other similar 
cases, has eloquently stated: 
 
       If the phrase is given literal effect, only the healthiest 
       of individuals would be given the protection of their 
       policies. Those suffering from even the slightest pre- 
       existing medical condition would be precluded from 
       benefits--the purchased coverage would be illusory. 
       The court will not construe the contract to defeat, 
       rather than promote, the purpose of accident 
       insurance. The court therefore concludes that literal 
       application of the phrase "direct result, independent of 
       all other causes" defeats the reasonable expectations of 
       insureds. 
 
Henry v. Home Ins. Co., 907 F. Supp. 1392, 1397 (C.D. Cal. 
1995). Such a result could not be consistent with the 
reasonable expectations of the insured. See Kievit, 170 A.2d 
at 26, 30; see also Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 
406, 414 (N.J. 1985) ("The interpretation of insurance 
contracts to accord with the reasonable expectations of the 
insured, regardless of the existence of any ambiguity in the 
policy, constitutes judicial recognition of the unique nature 
of contracts of insurance."). 
 
We recognize that this observation may be in tension with 
a literal reading of the Runyon decisions. However, those 
cases were based upon a strict construction approach to 
limited coverage and exclusionary clauses which we do not 
believe is tenable after Kievit specifically applied the 
reasonable expectations doctrine to this area of New Jersey 
insurance law. See, e.g., Werner Industries, Inc. v. First 
State Ins. Co., 548 A.2d 188, 191 (N.J. 1988) ("At times, 
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even an unambiguous contract has been interpreted 
contrary to its plain meaning so as to fulfill the reasonable 
expectations of the insured."); Kievit, 170 A.2d at 30 
(rejecting literal interpretation of limited coverage clause).8 
Accordingly, we predict that the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey would not apply a literal reading of the Runyon 
opinions to this case. 
 
The question remains, however, whether that court would 
agree with Tomaiuoli that recovery can only be had if the 
pre-existing condition was latent, dormant, and symptom- 
free. We predict not. Consider, for example, a situation in 
which an individual has been diagnosed with a slow-moving 
cancer that is likely to cause his death in ten or fifteen 
years and which is thus, by definition, not inactive. Let us 
further assume: (1) the disease carries with it certain 
symptoms, all of which are presently controlled by 
medication and treatment; and (2) the individual has been 
living a normal and productive life and is expected to do so 
until the cancer finally progresses to its terminal stage (i.e. 
in ten to fifteen years). Assume also that the individual 
suffers an entirely fortuitous accident and, due to serious 
injuries suffered in that accident, his previously controlled 
condition is aggravated, resulting in death. We doubt that, 
in light of the reasonable expectations doctrine, New Jersey 
would hold that his beneficiaries should be deprived of 
accidental death benefits just because his pre-existing 
disease, which acted in combination with the accidental 
injury to cause his untimely death, was not "inactive and 
symptom free." 
 
What this hypothetical points out, we believe, is that the 
patent/latent categorization scheme suggested in Tomaiuoli 
is too simplistic, and yields results inconsistent with the 
reasonable expectations of insureds. As Appleman & 
Appleman, supra, have noted, while a move away from this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We have on several occasions recognized and applied New Jersey's 
adoption of the reasonable expectations doctrine. See, e.g., Oritani 
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 989 F.2d 635, 638 
(3d Cir. 1993); Vargas v. Hudson County Bd. of Elections, 949 F.2d 665, 
671-72 (3d Cir. 1991); Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 
308-310 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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scheme "is not as satisfactory as the ability to decree a 
clean line of demarcation, it might be more consistent with 
the realities of existence." Appleman & Appleman, supra, 
S 391 at 52-3. And, we add, it is more consistent with the 
ability of modern medicine to prolong life. While Tomaiuoli 
was correct in recognizing that Kievit distinguished its facts 
from the Runyon facts along the patent-latent axis, we 
believe -- and predict that the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey would similarly believe -- that Tomaiuoli erred (an 
error which the district court here followed) in raising this 
essentially factual distinction to the level of legal 
categorization. 
 
It is important to note also that all of the New Jersey 
precedents discussed above are heavily fact-bound, relying 
upon the precise nature of the insured's pre-existing 
condition; the relationship between that condition, the type 
of accident, and the resulting disability; and the language 
of the applicable insurance policy. In none of these cases 
were the New Jersey courts faced with a factual scenario 
like the cancer hypothetical or the present case, in which 
the defendant suffered from arguably "active" diseases 
which the jury could find, based on medical expert 
testimony, were reasonably under control by virtue of the 
insured's then-existing medical treatments.9 While such a 
condition is not "dormant" in any technical sense of the 
word, it is functionally like a "dormant" condition in the 
important respect that it did not pose an immediate threat 
of death until triggered by the injury.10  Of course, such an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Tomaiuoli is the closest case to the present one on the facts. Mr. 
Tomaiuoli's heart disease and diabetes were diagnosed a few years prior 
to his accident and were monitored during regular checkups. His doctor 
noted "no signification [sic] changes" in his conditions during this time, 
and it appears that medication was prescribed at some point. See 
Tomaiuoli, 182 A.2d at 585-86. The court found additionally that 
"arteriosclerosis and its attendant symptoms are the invariable 
consequences of the aging process and are progressive in varying degrees 
depending upon the arterial fortitude of the individual." Id. at 587. The 
court does not make note of any testimony to the effect that Mr. 
Tomaiuoli's conditions were under control at the time of accident, 
however. 
 
10. Both Kievit and Mahon appear to attach significance to whether or 
not the insured was aware of his pre-existing condition prior to the time 
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analogy may or may not be appropriate on the facts of a 
particular case -- as noted in Kievit, just because an active 
or virulent pre-existing condition might not have killed the 
insured had the accident not happened does not mean that 
the condition is not a proximate contributing cause. See 
Kievit, 170 A.2d at 30. But this is a question of fact, not a 
question of law. 
 
Bearing in mind New Jersey's broad and liberal 
construction of insurance policies in favor of the insured, 
see, e.g., Dittmar v. Continental Cas. Co., 150 A.2d 666, 672 
(N.J. 1959), its adoption of the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations, and the harshness with which the rule 
advanced by these insurers would operate under some 
factual scenarios, we do not believe that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would adhere to the insurers' mechanical 
reading of New Jersey law. To the contrary, we believe that 
the court would hold that in cases such as the present one, 
in which there is medical evidence to a reasonable degree of 
certainty that the insured's relevant pre-existing conditions, 
even if active and symptomatic and capable of ultimately 
causing death, were under control at the time of the 
accident, and that the insured was expected to live a 
productive life for the foreseeable future (measured in terms 
of years), it is a question of fact for the jury to decide 
whether the pre-existing condition or the accident was the 
cause of the defendant's death or disability under an ADB 
policy. 
 
The remaining question is the standard of causation. The 
traditional term is "proximate cause," but there appears to 
be some confusion in the case law and scholarly 
commentary as to how that term should be defined in this 
context. More specifically, there is some difference of 
opinion whether it should be defined in the same way as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of the injury. In light of modern medicine's increasingly developed 
ability 
to detect diseases in their nascent stages, we fail to see how this 
distinction could continue to have much meaning. That is, we discern 
little difference between a disease or condition that is unknown to the 
patient and asymptomatic, and one that is known but that is being 
treated to the extent that it is considered "under control." The relevant 
question in both instances is the same -- to what extent is the pre- 
existing condition affecting the life (and life expectancy) of the 
patient? 
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that term is used in standard negligence cases, or whether 
it should be defined as the "predominant cause." See, e.g., 
Appleman & Appleman, supra, S 362 at 484-85, 487 ("it is 
necessary only that the accident stand out as a 
predominant factor in producing the loss") (citing cases); 
Carroll v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Society, 894 P.2d 746, 755 
(Colo. 1995) (en banc) ("Courts when using the word 
`proximate cause,' however, seem to intend no more that to 
distinguish between remote and predominant causes."). 
 
The Mahon court appears to conflate the two terms: 
 
       [T]he test is whether the accidental injury, as 
       contrasted with the contributing disease or bodily 
       condition, is the proximate or predominant cause of 
       the disability or loss, sometimes additionally qualified 
       as the active, efficient, dominant, originating, or direct 
       cause. 
 
Mahon, 167 A.2d at 201. The New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Kievit uses the term "proximate cause" without defining it, 
although the court does discuss Mahon's definition and 
seems to approve of it. See Kievit, 170 A.2d at 487-90 
(noting Mahon's definition of proximate cause as the "direct, 
efficient, and predominant cause."). In consideration of the 
foregoing, we predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
would define "proximate cause" in this setting as the direct, 
efficient, and predominant cause of the insured's death. We 
note that this was the test the district court applied in 
instructing the jury and ruling on defendants' motion for 
judgment as a matter of law. 
 
Adoption of the rule we have described would bring New 
Jersey in line with the modern approach taken by courts of 
other jurisdictions. See Appleman & Appleman, supra, at 
S 393; see also, e.g., Carroll v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Society, 
894 P.2d 746, 755 (Colo. 1995) (holding that benefits are 
recoverable "as long as one can show that the accident is 
the predominant cause of the [death]."); Life Ins. Co. of 
North America v. Evans, 637 P.2d 806, 808-09 (Mont. 1981) 
("Recovery may be had even though the disease appears to 
have actually contributed to the cause of death as long as 
the accident sets in motion the chain of events leading to 
death, or if it is the prime or moving cause."). We believe 
that New Jersey would follow this course. 
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Under this standard, the evidence adduced by the 
plaintiff would support a verdict in her favor. Although it is 
undisputed that some of Mr. Murray's conditions were 
active and symptomatic and capable of ultimately causing 
his death, Dr. Scotti testified that they were under control, 
that Mr. Murray would have lived with them for years, that 
the accident caused an exacerbation of the pre-existing 
conditions, and that the accident was the predominant 
cause of death.11 If so, the death could be found by the jury 
to be proximately caused by an "accident and independent 
of all other causes" within the stipulated limited coverage 
clause of the policy as we have construed it, and the 
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants 
must be vacated. 
 
IV. The Jury Charge 
 
The defendants contend that, even if the district court 
improperly granted judgment as a matter of law, the jury 
rendered its verdict pursuant to erroneous instructions, 
and a properly instructed jury would have had no choice 
but to find in their favor. They therefore assert that they 
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this 
alternative ground. 
 
We agree that the jury charge as given by the district 
court did not conform to New Jersey law as we predict it.12 
Nonetheless, we will not reverse a judgment where "it is 
highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
judgment," McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 
916, 924 (3d Cir. 1985), i.e., where the challenged error 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. As we noted in Part II, supra, the district court found that the 
"particulars, the specifics of Dr. Scotti's testimony" belie Dr. Scotti's 
testimony that all of Mr. Murray's pre-existing conditions were under 
control at the time of the accident. While the district court could be 
justified in reaching this conclusion on a de novo review of the facts, it 
is error in the context of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, since 
there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to 
accept Dr. Scotti's conclusion, and since the evidence must be taken in 
a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See supra note 4. 
 
12. We of course do not mean to be critical of the district judge, who, 
given the opaqueness of New Jersey law in this area, could hardly have 
been expected to divine what our prediction would be. 
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was harmless. We conclude that the findings necessarily 
implicit in the verdict of the jury compel the conclusion 
that the jury would have reached the same result had it 
been instructed according to the correct legal standard as 
we have explained it. Therefore, the error in the instruction 
was harmless.13 Cf. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. 
International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc., 822 F.2d 267, 
275 (2d Cir. 1987) (if jury's findings would support verdict 
under proper instructions "no useful purpose could be 
served by submitting the same evidence to another jury"); 
H.C. Blackwell Co. v. Kenworth Truck Co., 620 F.2d 104, 
107 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); 9A Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure S 2540 
(1995) ("If the trial court erroneously grants a renewed 
motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), 
the appellate court may reverse and order reinstatement of 
the verdict of the jury."). 
 
In relevant part, the jury was instructed as follows: 
 
       You are instructed with respect to this first element 
       that if you find that the disease condition of the 
       insured at the time of the accident was either active, 
       known, symptomatic, or progressive, and of such a 
       nature and severity in and of itself so as to be capable 
       of contributing to his death, then plaintiff has not met 
       plaintiff's burden of proof with respect to this element, 
       and you should end your deliberations and return a 
       verdict for defendants. 
 
       If, on the other hand, you find that at the time of the 
       accident, the disease condition of the insured was 
       inactive and under control, and was not sufficient to 
       cause death, then plaintiff has met plaintiff's burden 
       of proof with respect to the first element, and you 
       should proceed to consider the second element; which 
       is, second, that the accidental injury was the direct, 
       efficient and predominant cause of death, in that it set 
       in progress the chain of events leading directly to death 
       by exciting or triggering the pre-existing condition into 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. For the same reason we reject defendants' assertion that if the jury 
could reasonably have ruled in plaintiff's favor under proper instructions 
then a new trial should be ordered under the present circumstances. 
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       activity, and thereby hasten death so as to cause it to 
       occur at an earlier period than it would have occurred 
       but for the accident. 
 
According to this instruction, for the jury to have returned 
a verdict for the plaintiff, it necessarily must have found 
that, at the time of the accident, Mr. Murray's pre-existing 
conditions were: (1) inactive, (2) under control, and (3) not 
sufficient to cause death. 
 
As we explained supra, whether the insured's conditions 
were "active" or "sufficient to cause death" is not 
dispositive. An insured suffering from conditions that are 
active, symptomatic, and ultimately capable of causing 
death may still recover under an ADB policy for an 
accidental death so long as there is medical evidence to a 
reasonable degree of certainty that the insured's conditions 
were under control at the time of the accident. Since the 
jury found that Mr. Murray's conditions were under such 
control, we have no reservations in concluding that the jury 
would also have found for the plaintiff under the standard 
as we have articulated it. 
 
This is not the end of the analysis, however. As quoted 
above, the district court also instructed the jury that it 
must find that the accidental injury was the "direct, 
efficient, and predominant cause of death." Since we have 
predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would apply 
this same causation test, this prong is also satisfied. 
Indeed, the district court found that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's conclusion on the causation 
prong under the instructions given. Since we have found 
congruence between the findings implicit in the jury's 
verdict and both the control and causation prongs of our 
standard, in addition to vacating the judgment of the 
district court, we will remand with instructions to reinstate 
the verdict in favor of plaintiff. 
 
The parties shall bear their own costs. 
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